The White House midterm strategy—outlined by Trump political chief James Blair in a recent interview with the Free Press—looks good on paper. It has two elements. First, remind voters what President Trump has achieved and wants to do. Second, show voters that Democrats lack a governing vision.
Mr. Blair admits “domestic economic pressure” will be central to the campaign. Still, he believes that in light of the president’s achievements and the economy’s underlying strength, there won’t be “a blue wave at all.” The country is narrowly divided, with “not many voters to move around.” It will be “trench warfare” in battleground contests, but he’s confident the president can turn out Republican voters.
Mr. Blair’s view is backed by Mr. Trump’s pollster John McLaughlin. He told the Free Press that the challenge is “to not let it become a referendum on President Trump” but instead make it “a contrast election.” Still, a successful strategy must be executed properly on all fronts. That’s the problem.
Some things we can’t evaluate until after Election Day—such as how effectively Team Trump will have wielded its financial advantage. The fundraising totals for GOP groups and MAGA dwarf those of Democratic candidate, party and political-action committees. Whether Republicans will deploy this well and before voter opinions harden is an open question.
Similarly, it appears the GOP’s get-out-the-vote operation is well-planned while the Democratic National Committee’s is flailing. These activities are hard for outsiders to quantify. Yet whatever mechanical advantages the GOP has could be offset by the raw emotion of Democrats eager to vote against the president.
Messaging is one of the few areas of Team Trump’s execution we can judge in real time. The past month it’s been awful.
Especially given Mr. Trump’s poor approval numbers, he has to drive home each day what the GOP has accomplished and will accomplish—and clearly contrast that with what Democrats believe and promise. Instead, we’ve gotten off-putting confusion.
Start in early September. The big news out of Republicans’ first-ever midterm convention: If the GOP won, Mr. Trump would give every adult $5,000. There was no prior consultation with congressional Republicans, and there were conflicting explanations of how it would be paid for. No choir of supportive voices cheering the idea had been organized. It was crickets.
Then on Sept. 14, Donald Trump Jr. confirmed to the media that a Russian oligarch paid for his lavish post-wedding celebrations. That’s never a good look.
Two days later, the president asserted Iranian leaders “want to make a deal.” Six days after that, he said he might have to “annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly.” This left voters whipsawed.
On Sept. 16, the president said the Kennedy Center would “end up being ripped down” unless the administration received “recognition”—i.e., his name on the building.
Later that week, the president banned CNN, MS NOW and Politico from the White House press room. A judge soon restored access with a temporary restraining order as the outlets’ lawsuit against the administration proceeds.
Even as GOP candidates are trying to make radical New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani the Democratic Party’s face, the president met with the mayor in what a reporter called a “lovefest.” It’s hard to make Mr. Mamdani a pariah—and tarnish Democrats by extension—when Mr. Trump says the self-described socialist has “great potential.”
